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Who Is to Blame? 
(and What Is to Be Done?) 
LIABILITY OF SECONDARY ACTORS UNDER FEDERAL 
SECURITIES LAWS AND THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Large-scale wrongs that inflict injuries on millions are rarely the 
doings of a single person or entity but instead often involve the 
participation of multiple secondary actors.1 A cable-box supplier enters 
into a series of forged deals with a telecommunications company 
allowing the company to overstate its revenue and thus mislead the 
investing public about its financial health.2 An American automaker sells 
custom-made military trucks to the government of apartheid-era South 
Africa, which the government uses to terrorize the country’s black 
majority.3 In both of these cases the underlying wrong—securities fraud 
and genocide—would be actionable under a federal statute. Section 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Section 10(b)”) prohibits 
corporations from making fraudulent statements to the investing public,4 
while the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) allows U.S. federal courts to 
hear civil suits brought by victims of human rights abuses and other 
international crimes.5 But whereas these federal statutes successfully 
target the underlying illegal conduct itself, they fail to specify which 
actors can be held accountable for the particular offense. Instead, the task 
  
 1 Secondary actors are parties that did not themselves commit the underlying wrong but, 
through their conduct, contributed to and ultimately made possible the commission of the wrong. 
See, e.g., Mark Harden, U.S. High Court Moves “Secondary Actors” Off Main Stage, DENVER BUS. 
J., Jan. 25, 2008, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2008/01/28/story14.html 
(describing secondary actors in the securities litigation context as “third parties, such as accountants, 
banks, law firms and suppliers, with business ties to accused companies . . . [who] secretly help[] the 
companies defraud their investors”); cf. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 459 
(3d ed. 2001) (“The ‘primary party’ is the person who personally commits the . . . offense. . . . Any 
person who is not the primary party, but who is associated with him in commission of an offense is a 
‘secondary party.’”); Lynda J. Oswald, International Issues in Secondary Liability for Intellectual 
Property Rights Infringement, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 247, 247 (2008) (“Secondary liability is liability that 
is imposed upon a defendant who did not directly commit the wrongdoing at issue, but whom the 
law nonetheless holds responsible for the injuries caused.”). 
 2 See generally Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 
(2008). 
 3 See generally Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 4 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). 
   5  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
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of defining the scope of liability with regard to secondary actors is left to 
the courts.6 
In the securities fraud context, the Supreme Court has taken a 
restrictive position, ruling in its 1994 decision in Central Bank of 
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.7 that Section 10(b) 
did not permit a private cause of action for aiding and abetting—a type 
of secondary actor liability.8 That decision, however, did not entirely 
foreclose liability of secondary actors under Section 10(b) because 
plaintiffs developed legal theories that allowed them to stretch the limits 
of primary liability to reach certain non-primary actors.9 More recently, 
the Supreme Court further narrowed Section 10(b) liability for secondary 
actors holding in Stoneridge Investment Partners LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc.10 that a secondary actor was only liable for securities fraud 
if plaintiffs could show that their damages were a direct result of the 
secondary actor’s conduct itself, rather than the overall fraudulent 
scheme.11 
In contrast, the Supreme Court did not speak on the scope of 
liability under ATCA until 2004, and even then the Court did not directly 
address the issue of secondary actor liability.12 Most lower courts that 
have faced the issue have assumed that ATCA allows aiding-and-
abetting liability.13 Thus, in 2007, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.14 reversed the dismissal of 
ATCA claims brought by victims of the South African apartheid regime 
against a number of U.S. and foreign corporations, alleging that the 
corporations aided and abetted the regime’s numerous atrocities by 
supplying industrial, technological, and financial resources to the South 
African government.15 But the Appeal Court’s split opinion and extensive 
dicta highlighted the numerous problems with allowing aiding-and-
abetting liability under ATCA, such as the absence of a clear standard for 
aiding and abetting in the context of international law violations, as well 
as public policy concerns over holding corporations accountable merely 
for doing business with oppressive regimes.16 Therefore, in the long run, 
the future of secondary actor liability under ATCA remains uncertain. 
Central Bank and Stoneridge on the one hand and Khulumani on 
the other, although addressing two very different areas of law, share a 
  
 6 See infra Part V (discussing the role of federal courts in interpreting the scope of 
Section 10(b) and ATCA). 
 7 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 8 Id. at 191. 
 9 See infra text accompanying notes 90-98. 
 10 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). 
 11 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 770 (2008). 
 12 See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004). 
 13 See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 14 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 
 15 Id. at 260. 
 16 See infra Part IV. 
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common set of questions: When is one entity responsible for the harm 
caused by another? Does the same law that proscribes a particular type of 
wrongdoing govern the conduct of all parties that contribute to the 
wrongdoing? What is the difference between the liability of a primary 
and a secondary actor? As a result, these cases provide a unique 
opportunity to examine and compare the limits of liability of secondary 
actors in the securities fraud and international human rights contexts. 
By analyzing the more mature and developed jurisprudence on 
secondary actor liability under Section 10(b), this Note attempts to derive 
lessons for, and predict the future of, corporate accountability under 
ATCA. Part II of the Note introduces the concept of aiding-and-abetting 
in the general context of secondary actor liability. This Part shows that, 
despite its deep historical roots, the doctrine of aiding-and-abetting 
liability, especially in the civil context, lacks clarity and consistency, 
which often puts it in the center of politically-charged debate about 
corporate accountability. Part III examines the evolution of secondary 
actor liability in Section 10(b) claims from Central Bank to Stoneridge 
and discusses how the Supreme Court has, over time, limited plaintiffs’ 
ability to sue secondary actors for securities fraud.  
Part IV analyzes aiding-and-abetting liability in the context of 
ATCA claims, and, in particular, takes a close look at the Khulumani 
decision, whose split opinion suggests a trend towards a more restrictive 
construction of ATCA. Finally, Part V argues that while aiding-and-
abetting liability under ATCA was tentatively upheld in Khulumani, it 
will likely be eliminated by the Supreme Court when the issue comes 
before it. This Part demonstrates that the same reasoning that lead the 
Supreme Court to strike down aiding-and-abetting liability under Section 
10(b) in Central Bank will control the question of aiding-and-abetting 
liability under ATCA. However, this restriction of ATCA’s scope will 
not entirely foreclose claims against corporations that contribute to 
human rights abuses and other international crimes, as, just like in 
securities fraud suits, plaintiffs will be able to reinvent primary liability 
to reach secondary actors, and will also develop alternative legal theories 
for recovery and corporate accountability. 
II. AIDING AND ABETTING AS A SUBSET OF SECONDARY ACTOR 
LIABILITY 
The problem of secondary actor liability under the Securities 
Exchange Act and ATCA, and the subset issue of liability for aiding and 
abetting, stems to a large extent from the doctrinal confusion surrounding 
these concepts and their relationship to primary liability. Aiding and 
abetting is a typical way in which a secondary actor can contribute to the 
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underlying offense.17 Whether aiding and abetting gives rise to primary 
or secondary liability, however, remains doctrinally unsettled and 
practically controversial. 
Aiding and abetting is usually associated with accessorial 
liability18 and often serves as a “shorthand term . . . [that] connotes some 
lesser actor—not the individual who commits the offense—but the 
individual who offers assistance to the primary actor.”19 In the securities 
fraud context, for example, aiding and abetting is used as an antonym to 
primary liability.20 But the long history of the term suggests a more 
complicated and fluid relationship between aiding and abetting and 
primary liability. 
A. Aiding-and-Abetting Liability in the Criminal Context 
In his History of the English Laws, William Blackstone 
distinguished between principal and accessory (or secondary) criminal 
culpability.21 In turn, he divided principal culpability into first and second 
degrees.22 According to Blackstone, “[a] principal in the first degree is he 
that is the actor or absolute perpetrator of the crime; and in the second 
degree he is who is present, aiding and abetting the fact to be done.”23 
Thus, Blackstone categorized aiding and abetting as part of primary, not 
secondary liability. 
Similarly, a federal statute that codified criminal aiding-and-
abetting liability in 190924 makes anyone who “commits an offense 
against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or 
procures its commission . . . punishable as a principal.”25 Significantly, 
the original language of the statute simply stated that one who aids or 
  
 17 Other ways in which a secondary actor may contribute to the offense include 
participation in a criminal enterprise or conspiracy, instigation, and procurement. See Tarek F. 
Maassarani, Four Counts of Corporate Complicity: Alternative Forms of Accomplice Liability Under 
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 39, 39 (2005-06). 
 18 See DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 459 (“[A] person may be held accountable for the 
conduct of another person if he assists the other in committing an offense. Liability of this nature is 
called ‘accomplice’ or ‘accessory’ liability.”). 
 19 Adam Harris Kurland, To “Aid, Abet, Counsel, Command, Induce, or Procure the 
Commission of an Offense”: A Critique of Federal Aiding and Abetting Principles, 57 S.C. L. REV. 
85, 86 (2005). 
  20 Thus, under Central Bank, plaintiffs cannot sue aiders and abettors under Section 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act because the Act has been interpreted to impose only primary liability. 
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994); see 
infra Part III.B. 
 21 WILLIAM C. SPRAGUE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ABRIDGED 437 (Callaghan & 
Co. 9th ed. 1915) (1892). 
 22 Id. (“A man may be principal in an offence in two degrees.”). 
 23 Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added) (explaining that presence, for purposes of defining 
principal culpability, may be actual physical or constructive). 
 24 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 332, 35 Stat. 1088 (1909) (current version at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2(a) (2006)).  
 25 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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abets a federal crime “is a principal.”26 However, a 1951 amendment 
changed the formulation to “is punishable as a principal” to “eliminate 
all doubt that in the cases of offenses whose prohibition is directed at 
members of specified classes . . . [an aider and abettor] who is not 
himself a member of that class may nonetheless be punished as a 
principal.”27 
Thus, the doctrine of criminal aiding and abetting, from which 
civil aiding and abetting originates,28 is not entirely clear on whether 
aiders and abettors are liable as primary or secondary offenders. From a 
theoretical point of view, this is due to the fact that aiding and abetting, 
and secondary actor liability more generally, is premised on the common 
law concept of concerted action.29 Under this concept, one who 
participates in concerted conduct on behalf of another or a group is 
jointly and severally liable for the actions of the entire group and of each 
individual member.30 In a sense, then, a secondary actor whose conduct 
falls under the legal standard for concerted action becomes the primary 
actor. 
In practice, this doctrinal confusion leads to a lack of consensus 
among courts regarding the applicable standard that defines criminal 
aiding and abetting.31 For example, courts disagree on the requisite mens 
rea element for proving aiding and abetting.32 Some courts, guided by the 
principle of equal moral blameworthiness underlying the doctrine, 
consider aiding and abetting a specific intent offense and require that the 
aider and abettor intend that the primary actor commit the underlying 
crime.33 Yet other courts routinely apply the lower knowledge standard, 
which only requires that the aider and abettor be aware of the underlying 
  
 26 § 332, 35 Stat. at 1152 (emphasis added). 
 27 Kurland, supra note 19, at 90. 
 28 Christine L. Eid, Comment, Lawyer Liability for Aiding and Abetting Squeeze-Outs, 
34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2008); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994). 
 29 Eid, supra note 28, at 1180. 
 30 Id. at 1180. 
 31 Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor 
and the Causer under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1344, 1351 (2002) (“[T]he current 
status of the law on the aider and abettor’s mental state is . . . best described today as in a state of 
chaos . . . .”); see also Kurland, supra note 19, at 85 (“Federal aiding and abetting law, which has 
been spinning out of control for quite some time, has now spun totally out of control.”). 
 32 Judge Learned Hand famously formulated the mens rea standard by requiring that an 
aider and abettor “in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in 
something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed.” United States 
v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938). 
 33 See, e.g., United States v. Bancalari, 110 F.3d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1997) (“To sustain 
a conviction for aiding and abetting, the evidence must show that the defendant ‘specifically 
intended to facilitate the commission of [the principal’s] crimes’ . . . .”) (alteration in original); 
United States v. Scotti 47 F.3d 1237, 1240-41, 1244 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a mortgage broker 
who assisted in an extortionist loan scheme by arranging mortgage refinancing for the victim was 
liable as an aider and abettor only if he acted with “the specific intent that his act . . . bring about the 
underlying crime” (quoting United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1988))). 
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offense.34 Likewise, there is no agreement among courts regarding how 
to treat the actus reus element of criminal aiding and abetting, in 
particular whether it is necessary to show that the secondary actor’s 
conduct was the but-for cause of the harm.35 In practice, this uneven 
application of the doctrine often leads to unfair results.36 
B. Aiding-and-Abetting Liability in the Civil Context 
In the civil context, the doctrine of aiding-and-abetting liability 
suffers from even more uncertainty than in the criminal field. There are 
several reasons for this. First, in contrast to the criminal context, 
Congress has not enacted a federal civil aiding-and-abetting statute.37 As 
a result, federal courts are left entirely to their own devices in defining 
the standard for civil aiding and abetting.38 Although the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts made an attempt at bringing some uniformity to the 
field,39 the Restatement’s definition of aiding and abetting has not 
enjoyed wide acceptance among courts.40 
Second, although civil aiding-and-abetting liability, in the form 
of concerted action, has a long history,41 the doctrine is substantially less 
developed than its criminal counterpart. Remaining relatively obscure for 
  
 34 See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 44 F.3d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1995) (“One who, 
knowing the criminal nature of another’s act, deliberately renders what he knows to be active aid in 
the carrying out of the act is . . . an aider and abettor even if there is no evidence that he wants the 
act to succeed . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 236 (2000) (“For decades, the American courts and legislatures have 
debated whether knowledge or ‘true purpose’ should be the required mens rea for accomplice 
liability.”). 
 35 Weisberg, supra note 34, at 228-30. 
 36 For example, requiring specific intent for aiding and abetting a “knowledge crime” 
such as loan sharking, seems anomalous since “[f]or the very same crime, the principal can be guilty 
when acting with knowledge or general intent, while the aider and abettor would not be guilty unless 
acting with the more culpable mental state of purposeful intent.” Weiss, supra note 31, at 1378. On 
the other hand, since aiders and abettors are “punishable as . . . principal[s],” 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006), it 
seems unfair to punish someone who merely knew about, but did not intend the commission of the 
underlying offense. Id. at 1344 (providing examples of factual scenarios that lead to such a result); 
see also Kurland, supra note 19, at 85. 
 37 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 
182 (1994). 
 38 Nathan Isaac Combs, Note, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 241, 
249 (2005) (“There is no clearly defined test for civil aiding and abetting liability because courts 
apply different tests and often obfuscate their analyses.”). 
 39 Section 876 of the Restatement provides: “For harm resulting to a third person from 
the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with 
the other or pursuant to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes 
a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct 
himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own 
conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).  
 40 Combs, supra note 38, at 254-58. 
 41 Richard C. Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting, 61 BUS. LAW. 1135, 1138 
(2006) (writing that the concept of civil aiding-and-abetting liability in English law goes back at 
least 400 years and has been cited in American cases since the mid-nineteenth century). 
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decades,42 civil aiding and abetting first gained prominence in the context 
of securities litigation.43 However, after the Supreme Court in Central 
Bank expressly eliminated a private cause of action for aiding and 
abetting federal securities fraud, the words “aid” and “abet” became 
taboo among plaintiffs’ lawyers. Thus, after Central Bank, the plaintiffs’ 
bar was forced to resort to expressions, such as “a scheme to defraud,” to 
describe conduct that would have previously been characterized as aiding 
and abetting.44 Recently though, the doctrine of aiding and abetting has 
been increasingly invoked in new contexts, such as professional 
malpractice, human rights violations, and terrorism.45 
Finally, civil aiding-and-abetting liability—a tort doctrine— 
frequently attaches to criminal conduct, which gives rise to additional 
problems. Although tort and penal law share a common origin and 
perform overlapping functions,46 applying tort standards to criminal acts 
can be problematic and lead to unfair outcomes. For example, a party 
charged with civilly aiding and abetting a crime will be defending 
against a less stringent tort standard and yet may face extremely large 
monetary penalties and societal condemnation, which normally only 
attaches to criminal convictions.47 As a result, the doctrine of civil aiding 
and abetting remains on shaky conceptual grounds and uneven in 
application.48  
Because of its potential to serve as a wide net against an 
unlimited number of third parties and its lack of clear standards, 
enforcement of the doctrine of civil aiding and abetting is often 
politically charged. Recently, in addition to securities litigation and 
ATCA suits, the doctrine has been applied in contexts that involve such 
diverse and controversial subjects as free speech, war on terror, and 
liability of lawyers for aiding and abetting their clients’ breach of duty. 
For instance, in Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute,49 a circuit court 
  
 42 Combs, supra note 38, at 246; see also Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983) (noting that the application of the doctrine was “largely confined to isolated acts of 
adolescents in rural society”). 
 43 Combs, supra note 38, at 246 n.6, 263. 
 44 Stephen Taub, Aiding and Abetting Gets More Attention, COMPLIANCE WEEK, May 
22, 2007, available at http://www.complianceweek.com/article/3359/aiding-and-abetting-gets-more-
attention (describing plaintiffs’ attempts to look “for other ways around” aiding and abetting, 
including sometimes relabeling the conduct as “scheme to defraud”); see infra notes 90-92 and 
accompanying text.  
 45 Mason, supra note 41, at 1135. 
 46 Combs, supra note 38, at 250 (“Conceptually speaking, both criminal and tort law are 
concerned with identifying and sanctioning wrongful conduct . . . .”). 
 47 See Mason, supra note 41, at 1146-63 (discussing the legal standards applied when 
imposing civil aiding-and-abetting liability for criminal offenses). 
 48 Combs, supra note 38, at 248-49 (While “the theory of civil liability for aiding and 
abetting is claiming a position of new importance in the law of torts . . . , [it] remains 
underdeveloped.”). 
 49 291 F.3d 1000, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh’g granted en banc, Boim v. 
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 511 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2007); see also infra notes 229-234 and 
accompanying text (discussing the rehearing decision).  
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upheld a tort action filed by the parents of an American teenager killed 
by the Palestinian militant group Hamas against several Muslim non-
profit organizations, alleging that the organizations aided and abetted an 
act of terrorism by donating money to Hamas.50 In Rice v. Paladin 
Enterprises, Inc.,51 another circuit court upheld an aiding-and-abetting 
action brought by the family of a murder victim against the author of 
“Hit Man,” an instructional manual for contract killers.52 
These examples show that the doctrine of aiding-and-abetting 
liability has evolved from its humble beginnings, as simply a type of 
accomplice liability, into a separate and elaborate cause of action 
implicating issues of social policy. Yet in spite of the attention it gets, the 
doctrine lacks clarity and consistency. The next Part further illustrates 
the doctrine’s ambiguity and controversial policy implications by 
showing how the Supreme Court has restricted its application in the 
context of Section 10(b) litigation, and how plaintiffs have responded by 
reinventing secondary actor liability as a form of primary liability. 
III. SECONDARY ACTOR LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT: FROM CENTRAL BANK TO 
STONERIDGE 
The last two decades have seen the doctrine of secondary actor 
liability in the securities fraud context evolve from the relatively 
permissive regime that allowed aiding-and-abetting liability for 
secondary actors to a more restrictive one that required private Section 
10(b) plaintiffs to plead all elements of a primary offense even against 
secondary defendants. A brief overview of the Section 10(b) 
jurisprudence helps better understand this evolution. 
A. Overview of Section 10(b) Claims 
Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 to address abuses in the securities markets, 
exposed by the 1929 Wall Street stock crash and the ensuing Great 
  
 50 For an analysis of political issues affecting cases like Boim, see John D. Shipman, 
Taking Terrorism to Court: A Legal Examination of the New Front in the War on Terrorism, 86 
N.C. L. REV. 526, 529-30 (2008) (“Although lawsuits against private sponsors of international 
terrorism appear to be a straightforward pursuit of justice, these cases have quickly evolved into a 
Byzantine game of complicated legal and political maneuvering—not only among some of the 
nation’s preeminent law firms, but also between Congress, the judiciary, and the executive branch.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 51 128 F.3d 233, 249-50 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 52 See Andrianna D. Kastanek, Comment, From Hit Man to a Military Takeover of New 
York City: The Evolving Effects of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises on Internet Censorship, 99 NW. U.L. 
REV. 383, 383 (2004) (analyzing the decision’s negative effects on freedom of speech on the 
Internet). 
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Depression.53 The 1933 Act regulates initial public offerings of securities 
and the 1934 Act concerns secondary market trading.54 The Acts contain 
several express rights of action.55 In addition, courts have found implied 
rights of action in the terms of sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the 1934 Act.56  
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act provides that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, [t]o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . , any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations 
as the [SEC] may prescribe.57 
The Act also authorizes the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to adopt rules implementing the provisions of 
Section 10(b).58 Under this mandate, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, 
which makes it unlawful for any person, “in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security” to:  
(a) . . . employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b). . . make any 
untrue statement [or omission] of a material fact . . . or (c). . . engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person.59 
Together, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have given rise to two 
basic theories of liability for securities fraud. Under one theory, based on 
the language in subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5 and often referred to as the 
“misstatement” theory, shareholders can sue a person or entity that has 
made a material misstatement (or, in some circumstances, an omission) 
to the investing public. Typical defendants under this theory include 
corporate officers and directors, who sign false or misleading financial 
reports filed with the SEC or make untrue statements to the press, the 
corporation itself, which is vicariously liable for the conduct of its 
officers and directors, and the accounting firms that issue audit opinions 
falsely certifying the accuracy of the company’s statements.60 
Under the second theory, grounded in Rule 10b-5’s subsections 
(a) and (c) and known as the “scheme to defraud” theory, a plaintiff can 
  
 53 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 
170-71 (1994). 
 54 See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2006)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006)).  
 55 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k (imposing liability on filers of false registration statements). 
 56 Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 171. 
 57 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
 58 Id. 
 59 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). Rule 10b-5, however, only reaches conduct already 
proscribed by Section 10(b). Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 
761, 768 (2008). 
 60 Andrew M. Edison, Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta: “Scheme Liability” in the High 
Court, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found., Wash., D.C.), Oct. 5, 2007, at 2, available at 
http://www.wlf.org/upload/10-05-07edison.pdf (describing a typical Section 10(b) claim against a 
primary actor).  
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pursue a cause of action against a defendant who engages in any 
deceptive conduct, including a manipulative act or a fraudulent scheme.61 
This type of claim is frequently asserted against secondary actors, such 
as the corporation’s business partners, underwriters, and outside auditors 
who, although they do not make public statements to the market in 
connection with the corporation’s securities, enter into fraudulent 
arrangements with the corporation as part of the overall deceptive 
scheme.62 
In addition to proving the actus reus element of the fraud, which 
can be either in the form of a misstatement or a deceptive act as part of a 
scheme to defraud, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with 
scienter,63 and that the plaintiff’s loss had a proximate relation to the 
substantive conduct or statement. This relation, in turn, must be proven 
by showing that (1) the plaintiff relied on the fraudulent statement or 
deceptive conduct in purchasing the corporation’s shares, and (2) the 
statement or conduct directly caused the plaintiff’s economic loss. 
In sum, whether the plaintiff is predicating her claim on the 
“misstatement,” or on the “scheme to defraud” theory, the plaintiff must 
prove (1) the actus reus, (2) scienter, (3) reliance, and (4) causation. A 
plaintiff who adequately pleads all of the above elements64 will state a 
claim for primary liability under Section 10(b), whether the defendant is 
a primary or a secondary actor.65 
B. Central Bank and the Rejection of Aiding-and-Abetting Liability 
Under Section 10(b) 
Plaintiffs rarely invoked the “scheme to defraud” theory in their 
suits until 1994.66 Prior to 1994, it was not necessary to plead every 
element of Section 10(b) as to each defendant in order to reach a 
  
 61 In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 62 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 
372 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Global Crossing, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 324-25.  
 63 Scienter, in the securities fraud context, refers to a state of mind “embracing intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). It has also 
been interpreted to encompass extreme recklessness. Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, What 
Constitutes Recklessness Sufficient to Show Necessary Element of Scienter in Civil Action for 
Damages Under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b)) and Rule 10b-5 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 A.L.R. Fed. 392 (2009). 
 64 Allegations sounding in fraud must be pled with particularity. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
Because a securities fraud case that meets the heightened pleading standard will most likely settle 
before trial, most cases focus on the plaintiff’s burden of stating a viable claim, rather than proving 
the allegations.  
 65 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 773-74, 764 
(2008) (“[T]he implied right of action in § 10(b) continues to cover secondary actors who commit 
primary violations” but “the conduct of a secondary actor must . . . satisfy each of the elements or 
preconditions for § 10(b) liability” to assert a primary violation.).  
 66 Matthew L. Mustokoff, “Scheme” Liability for Financial Institutions Under Rule 10-5, 
INSIGHTS: THE CORPORATE & SECURITIES LAW ADVISOR, Nov. 2005, 
http://www.weil.com/wgm/cwgmhomep.nsf/Files/MustokoffArticle1/$file/MustokoffArticle1.pdf. 
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secondary actor. Instead, plaintiffs followed the “path of least resistance” 
by alleging that a primary actor, e.g., the corporation, made a material 
misstatement or omission to the public regarding the corporation’s 
financial health, and a secondary actor, e.g., the corporation’s 
underwriter, aided and abetted the making of that misstatement or 
omission.67 Thus, as to the secondary actor, plaintiffs did not have to 
plead scienter, reliance, and causation. Rather, it was enough to satisfy 
the applicable aiding-and-abetting standard, such as substantial 
assistance with knowledge of the fraud. 
This situation changed in 1994 when the Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, N.A.68 The decision, which surprised many in the legal 
community,69 held that the implied cause of action under Section 10(b) 
did not reach aiders and abettors.70  
In Central Bank, the plaintiff bought $2.1 million worth of bonds 
issued by a Colorado Springs public authority.71 The bonds were secured 
by landowner assessment liens on property owned by the authority and 
tied to the property’s value. Defendant Central Bank acted as indenture 
trustee for the bond issue.72 During the closing of the bond sale, Central 
Bank learned that due to declines in land values in Colorado Springs, the 
assessment lien valuation completed earlier that year may have no longer 
reflected the current value of the land.73 Despite this knowledge, Central 
Bank failed to order a new valuation, and the authority went ahead with 
the bond sale.74 Within months of the closing, the authority defaulted on 
the bonds.75 Plaintiff brought a Section 10(b) suit naming the authority as 
a primary defendant and Central Bank as a secondary defendant.76 
Plaintiff alleged that Central Bank aided and abetted the wrongful bond 
sale by recklessly failing to order a new valuation of the lien, when it had 
reason to believe that the old valuation was inadequate.77 
The Supreme Court disagreed, affirming summary judgment for 
Central Bank on the grounds that private civil liability under Section 
10(b) did not extend to those who merely aided or abetted a practice 
  
 67 In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 68 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 69 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, High Court Ruling Sharply Curbs Suits on Securities 
Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1994, at D8 (reporting that “[t]he Supreme Court, sweeping aside years 
of lower court precedents as well as a longstanding policy of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, . . . sharply limited lawsuits that charge accountants and other outside professionals 
with taking part indirectly in a securities fraud”). 
 70 Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191.  
 71 Id. at 167-68. 
 72 Id. at 167. 
 73 Id. at 167-68. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 168. 
 76 Id.  
 77 Id.  
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prohibited by the statute.78 The Court determined that “when Congress 
enacts a statute under which a person may sue and recover damages from 
a private defendant for the defendant’s violation of some statutory norm, 
there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and 
abettors.”79 Instead, the text of the statute determined the scope of 
liability, and the absence of any reference to aiding and abetting in 
Section 10(b) was controlling.80 The Court contrasted Congress’s silence 
regarding aiding and abetting in the Securities Exchange Act to its 
express provision for such remedy in other contexts.81 
Further, the Court stated that even if it were to look beyond the 
statutory language, it would find that Congress in 1934 did not intend for 
Section 10(b) to reach aiders and abettors.82 First, the Court reasoned that 
since none of the Act’s express causes of action mentioned aiding-and-
abetting liability, Congress likely did not intend to provide for such 
liability in Section 10(b)’s implied cause of action either.83 Second, the 
Court rejected the plaintiff’s proposition that aiding-and-abetting liability 
was implied in every statutorily created private right of action because 
the doctrine “was ‘well established in both civil and criminal actions by 
1934’” and Congress “legislated with an understanding of general 
principles of tort law.”84 The Court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ 
reasoning, instead finding that the doctrine of civil aiding and abetting 
was “at best uncertain in application” and not very well developed.85 
Moreover, the fact that Congress never enacted a “general civil aiding 
and abetting statute” also weighed against accepting the broad 
presumption in favor of implying aiding-and-abetting liability in every 
action.86  
Finally, the Court found that there were policy considerations for 
restricting the scope of Section 10(b) to primary violations.87 These 
included the uncertainty of the standard regarding aiding-and-abetting 
liability, the highly fact-sensitive nature of any inquiry into such liability, 
and the resultant potential for excessive litigation.88 Although conceding 
  
 78 Id. at 191-92 
 79 Id. at 182. 
 80 Id. at 173. 
 81 Id. at 176 (“Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose 
to do so.” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 7 U.S.C. § 192(g) as examples of statutes that expressly provided 
for aiding and abetting)). 
 82 Id. at 178. 
 83 Id. at 179. 
 84 Id. at 181 (quoting Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10, Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 
511 U.S. 164 (1994)). 
 85 Id. at 181-82 (noting that, until the proliferation of securities suits, aiding and abetting 
was “‘largely confined to isolated acts of adolescents in rural society’” (quoting Halberstam v. 
Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983))). 
 86 Id. at 182. 
 87 See id. at 188-90. 
 88 Id. at 188-89. 
2009] SECONDARY ACTOR LIABILITY 1551 
that “competing policy arguments in favor of aiding-and-abetting 
liability can also be advanced,” the Court found that these arguments 
were not sufficient to override the text of the statute.89 
C. Testing the Limits of Primary Liability for Secondary Actors 
After Central Bank 
While expressly striking down aiding-and-abetting liability as a 
cause of action under Section 10(b), the Supreme Court in Central Bank, 
nevertheless stated that “[t]he absence of § 10(b) aiding-and-abetting 
liability does not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are 
always free from liability under the securities Acts.”90 Secondary actors 
could still be liable as primary violators in securities fraud, as long as the 
plaintiff adequately pleaded all elements of a Section 10(b) claim as to 
the secondary actor.91 Thus, although plaintiffs could no longer follow 
the “path of least resistance” by invoking aiding and abetting, they could 
still reach secondary actors by alleging that a secondary actor (1) 
engaged in some type of deceptive conduct, which was part of the 
primary actor’s overall scheme to defraud the investing public; (2) the 
secondary actor acted with scienter; (3) the plaintiff bought shares in 
reliance on the fraudulent information; and (4) the plaintiff suffered an 
economic loss as a direct result of this reliance.92 
Acknowledging the difficulty of proving individual reliance by 
each plaintiff on a false public statement, the Supreme Court had in prior 
opinions adopted two presumptions of reliance. First, under the duty-to-
disclose presumption, stemming from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States,93 where a defendant owes 
a plaintiff a duty of full disclosure but omits material information, 
plaintiff’s reliance on the wrongful omission is presumed.94 Second, 
under the fraud-on-the-market presumption, first articulated in Basic Inc. 
v. Levinson,95 a plaintiff is presumed to rely on information disseminated 
in an efficient securities market.96  
In the years following Central Bank, plaintiffs were able to 
invoke one of these presumptions to satisfy the reliance requirement as to 
  
 89 Id. at 189-90. 
 90  Id. at 191. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(discussing the elements of Section 10(b) liability), judgment vacated, 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008), 
opinion vacated, 519 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 93 406 U.S. 128 (1972).  
 94 Id. at 152-53. 
 95 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 96 Id. at 241-47. This presumption is based on the premise that in mature securities 
markets, like the public exchanges in the U.S., the price of a security “reflects all publicly available 
information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.” Id. at 246. “‘Misleading statements will 
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the 
misstatements.’” Id. at 241-42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986)).  
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both primary and secondary defendants. The reasoning was that 
plaintiffs’ reliance on the primary actor’s false statements could be 
imputed to the secondary actors because the secondary actors’ conduct 
was part of the same fraudulent scheme that created the false statements 
in the first place.97 Thus, to plead secondary actor liability, all plaintiffs 
had to do was show that they had constructively relied on the primary 
defendant’s misstatements, suffering an economic loss as a result, and 
that the secondary defendant, through its misconduct, had helped bring 
about the misstatements.98  
D. Further Tightening of the Standard Under Stoneridge 
In 2008, the Supreme Court’s decision in Stoneridge Investment 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.99 once again altered the 
landscape of secondary actor liability in securities fraud litigation. This 
time, the Court turned its attention to the issue of proving reliance and 
causation with regard to secondary actors. In Stoneridge, the plaintiffs 
alleged that Charter, a telecommunications company, engaged in a 
variety of fraudulent accounting practices to artificially inflate its stock 
price.100 One such practice, known as round-tripping, consisted of 
improperly recording revenue from certain barter transactions with third-
party suppliers.101 Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola provided Charter with 
digital cable converter (set-top) boxes.102 Charter agreed to overpay the 
suppliers $20 for each set-top box with the understanding that they 
would pay Charter back by purchasing unnecessary advertising from it.103 
This arrangement enabled Charter to inflate its revenue and operating 
cash flow by approximately $17 million.104 To conceal the fraud from its 
auditors, Charter convinced the suppliers to prepare forged 
  
 97 See Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1051 (“The requirement of reliance is satisfied [as to the 
secondary actor] if the introduction of misleading statements into the securities market was the 
intended end result of a scheme to misrepresent revenue.”) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim against the 
secondary defendant on other grounds); see also Joanna B. Apolinsky, Is There Any Viability to 
Scheme Liability for Secondary Actors After Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc.? (2008) (unpublished paper at 12), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/joanna_apolinsky/1 (“[A]lthough reliance [was] still a required element in 
the plaintiff’s case, the proof requirement thereof [was] significantly relaxed in these contexts.”). 
 98 Of course, plaintiffs still had to show that the secondary defendant acted with scienter. 
Since secondary actors were now only liable for primary violations, they had to have acted with the 
same state of mind as the primary actors to be held accountable under Section 10(b). Pleading 
scienter, therefore, became the biggest hurdle for plaintiffs in stating a claim against secondary 
actors. The scienter requirement also served as a safeguard against meritless suits or overexpansion 
of the universe of potential defendants. See, e.g., Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1049 (explaining that 
focusing on the inquiry into “the deceptive nature of the [secondary] defendant’s own conduct 
ensure[d] that only primary violators . . . [were] held liable under the Act”).  
 99 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). 
 100 Id. at 766. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 767. 
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documentation for the transactions, including letters to Charter falsely 
justifying the $20 increase in set-top box price by rising production 
costs.105 The suppliers also backdated the advertisement agreements to 
make it appear as though the barter transactions were independent of 
each other.106 
When the truth about Charter’s accounting fraud emerged and 
Charter’s stock price plummeted, investors brought a Section 10(b) suit 
against both Charter and the suppliers.107 The plaintiffs alleged that 
Charter made false and misleading statements to the public through its 
SEC filings, which contained the inflated earnings numbers.108 As for the 
suppliers, the plaintiffs averred that they engaged in fraudulent 
transactions with Charter, while knowingly or recklessly disregarding 
“Charter’s intention to use the transactions to inflate its revenues and 
[knowing] the resulting financial statements issued by Charter would be 
relied upon by . . . investors.”109 
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint 
against the suppliers for failure to state a claim, holding that Section 
10(b) does not provide for a private cause of action against a party who 
participated in another’s fraudulent scheme, but on whose conduct 
investors did not rely.110 Citing its decision in Central Bank, the Court 
reiterated the premise that only primary violations of Section 10(b) are 
subject to private suits and a plaintiff seeking to recover against a 
secondary actor in a securities fraud action must prove every element of 
the primary violation, including reliance.111 According to the Court, 
“[r]eliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s deceptive acts is an 
essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of action” and a “predicate 
for liability” because it provides the “‘requisite causal connection 
between a defendant’s [acts] and a plaintiff’s injury.’”112 Since the 
suppliers in this case neither made a public statement, nor violated a duty 
to disclose to the Charter investors, the Court reasoned that plaintiffs 
could not have relied on the suppliers’ actions in making their investment 
decisions.113 In other words, the suppliers’ fraudulent conduct could not 
be said to have caused the investors’ injury. 
Significantly, the Court expressly rejected the proposition that a 
secondary actor’s participation in the overall fraudulent scheme provided 
the necessary causal link between the actor’s conduct and the investors’ 
  
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 766. 
 108 Id. at 767. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 767-69. 
 111 Id. at 768. 
 112 Id. at 769 (quoting Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988)). 
 113 Id. 
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injury.114 According to the plaintiffs, the suppliers’ intentional or reckless 
participation in Charter’s fraudulent scheme warranted a presumption of 
reliance because Charter’s public financial statements were “a natural 
and expected consequence” of the suppliers’ deceptive conduct.115 The 
Court read the plaintiffs’ argument as proposing a general rule that “in an 
efficient market investors rely not only upon the public statements 
relating to a security but also upon the transactions those statements 
reflect.”116 
The majority declined to adopt this rule and instead embarked on 
an inquiry as to “whether [the suppliers’] acts were immediate or remote 
to the injury.”117 The Court concluded that the suppliers’ acts of 
deception were “too remote to satisfy the requirement of reliance” 
because it was Charter who reported fraudulent earnings in its financial 
statements, and “nothing [the suppliers] did made it necessary or 
inevitable for Charter to record the transactions as it did.”118 This part of 
the majority’s opinion led the dissent to criticize the Court for having in 
effect adopted a new “super-causation” requirement for proving 
reliance,119 and for failing, at the least, to remand the case to the lower 
court to determine whether the plaintiffs alleged enough facts to plead 
reliance.120 In the dissent’s view, the majority “ha[d] it backwards” when 
it interpreted the Basic fraud-on-the-market presumption to control the 
kind of conduct that can “cause” investor loss.121 According to the 
dissent, the purpose of the Basic presumption was to help plaintiffs who 
cannot show individual reliance on the fraudulent information.122 The 
presumption did not dictate what kind of conduct by the defendant could 
cause the plaintiff injury.123 Thus, following the dissent’s logic, it would 
be enough for investors to prove reliance by (1) demonstrating that a 
secondary defendant’s conduct had proximately caused false information 
to reach the market, and (2) invoking the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption to show that the false information was the basis for the 
plaintiffs’ investment decision. 
The majority also refused to expand the scope of liability under 
Section 10(b) to reach any secondary actors who committed a deceptive 
act in the process of facilitating the primary defendant’s fraudulent 
  
 114 Id. at 770. 
 115 Id. The Court summarized plaintiffs’ logic as follows: “[H]ad respondents not assisted 
Charter, Charter’s auditor would not have been fooled, and the financial statement[s] would have 
been a more accurate reflection of Charter’s financial condition.” Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119  Id. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 120 Id. at 775-76. 
 121 Id. at 776. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
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scheme.124 While recognizing that the suppliers’ conduct may be culpable 
under state common law fraud rules, the Court reiterated that Section 
10(b) “does not reach all commercial transactions that are fraudulent and 
affect the price of a security in some attenuated way.”125 Such an 
expansion, in the Court’s opinion, would effectively revive aiding-and-
abetting liability under Section 10(b), something it decisively struck 
down in Central Bank.126 In addition, the practical implication of such an 
expansion would be to “rais[e] the costs of doing business” in the U.S. 
because every market participant, whether it trades public securities or 
not, could become subject to frivolous and extortionary law suits.127 
Stoneridge, thus, completed the process of narrowing the scope 
of secondary actor liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, begun by Central Bank. Until 1994, shareholders could 
sue their issuers for fraudulently failing to disclose truthful information 
about the issuer’s financial health, and could simultaneously assert 
Section 10(b) claims against third parties that assisted, or aided and 
abetted, the failure. After Central Bank, plaintiffs could no longer plead 
aiding-and-abetting liability under Section 10(b), but they could still 
successfully sue certain secondary actors for conduct that contributed to 
the overall deception of the shareholders. Stoneridge further limited the 
scope of secondary actor liability by requiring plaintiffs to show a direct 
connection between the secondary actor’s wrongful conduct and the 
deception, so that plaintiffs can be said to have relied on the secondary 
actor’s conduct in making their investment decisions. The following Part 
shows how the recent South African apartheid litigation foreshadows a 
similar trend towards the narrowing of the secondary actor liability in the 
context of ATCA claims. 
IV. KHULUMANI V. BARCLAY AND AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY 
UNDER ATCA 
In contrast to the securities context, the Supreme Court has not 
addressed the issue of aiding-and-abetting liability under ATCA. To 
date, most lower courts to consider the issue have assumed that ATCA 
reaches aiders and abettors,128 much like how courts had assumed the 
existence of aiding-and-abetting liability under Section 10(b) prior to 
Central Bank. However, the recent dismissal by a district court of an 
aiding-and-abetting claim in a complaint filed by victims of the South 
  
 124 Id. at 770-71 (majority opinion). 
 125 Id. at 771. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 772. 
 128 BETH STEPHENS ET AL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 
268-70 (2d ed. 2008); see, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Cabello v. Fernández-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1158 (11th Cir. 2005); Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. 
Supp. 2d 1112, 1148-49 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 
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African apartheid129 suggested a new trend. Moreover, the Second 
Circuit’s split decision in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., 
although reinstating the complaint, demonstrates that the days of aiding-
and-abetting liability under ATCA may be numbered.  
A. History and Overview of ATCA 
ATCA provides in full that “[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”130 Adopted by the First Congress in 1789, the Act was rarely 
invoked until the 1980s when it gained prominence as a means for 
victims of international human rights abuses to claim redress in U.S. 
courts.131 In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,132 the first modern-era decision to 
uphold an action under ATCA, the Second Circuit held that a district 
court could exercise jurisdiction over a wrongful death claim brought by 
a citizen of Paraguay against a Paraguayan police officer who tortured 
and killed the plaintiff’s teenage son.133 After examining several sources 
of international law, the court concluded that government-sponsored 
torture constituted a violation of “the law of nations” within the meaning 
of ATCA, thus setting the precedent for later suits brought under the 
Act.134 Importantly, the court interpreted the term “law of nations” to 
include not just international law norms that existed in 1789, but also 
modern international law.135 
Over the next two decades, however, courts struggled to resolve 
“complex and controversial questions regarding the meaning and scope 
of ATCA.”136 The Supreme Court addressed some of these issues in 2004 
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.137 In Sosa, the plaintiff was a Mexican 
citizen who was abducted and forcibly brought to the U.S. to stand trial 
in a criminal case.138 The abduction was carried out by a group of 
Mexican operatives acting on orders of the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration.139 The plaintiff subsequently sued one of the Mexican 
  
 129 See In re South African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004), aff’d in part, vacated in part and remanded by Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 
F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d, American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). 
 130 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 131 Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability 
Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 211 
(2008). 
 132 630 F.2d 876 (1980). 
 133 Id. at 878. 
 134 Id. at 884. 
 135 See Daniel Diskin, Note, The Historical and Modern Foundations for Aiding and 
Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 805, 806 (2005). 
 136 Flores v. So. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 137 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 138 Id. at 697-98. 
 139 Id. 
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operatives under ATCA, alleging arbitrary arrest and forced detention in 
violation of international law.140 Although recognizing that ATCA 
authorized district courts to hear tort claims arising from certain 
violations of contemporary international law,141 the Supreme Court 
nevertheless dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint finding that it fell 
outside ATCA’s scope.142 In an effort to delineate the scope, the Court 
held that “the law of nations” in the modern sense is comprised only of 
international norms that are “accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with a specificity” comparable to the acceptance and specificity that 
defined “the historical paradigms familiar when [ATCA] was enacted.”143 
Applying this stringent standard to the plaintiff’s claim, the Sosa Court 
concluded that the claim was not actionable under ATCA because a one-
time illegal detention for a single day did not violate any norm that rose 
to the status of the law of nations.144 
B. Khulumani v. Barclay 
1. Factual and Procedural Background 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Khulumani v. Barclay National 
Bank Ltd. arose from a series of actions consolidated at the district court 
level as In re South African Apartheid Litigation.145 The actions were 
filed by several groups of plaintiffs on behalf of millions of victims of 
the apartheid regime, a system that existed in South Africa between 1948 
and at least 1991, whereby the country’s white minority dominated, 
oppressed, and exploited the majority black population.146 Under the 
system, the South African government restricted blacks to certain areas 
of the country, where they remained “in a state of near-enslavement.”147 
To keep the black population in obedience, the government authorities 
frequently cracked down on popular uprisings and used terror tactics, 
  
 140 Id. at 698-99. 
 141 Id. at 720, 724. 
 142 Id. at 725. 
 143 Id. at 724-25, 732 (offering as examples of such paradigms familiar in the late 18th 
century: “violation[s] of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy”). In 
elaborating the standard, the Court repeatedly emphasized ATCA’s limited reach. Id. at 720 
(“Congress intended [ATCA] to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions . . . .”). 
“[ATCA] was meant to underwrite litigation of a narrow set of common law actions . . . .” Id. at 721. 
“Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and 
obligatory.” Id. at 732 (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th 
Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 144 Id. at 738. 
 145 In re South African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part and remanded by Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 
2007), aff’d, American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). 
 146 See id. at 543 & n.7. 
 147 Id. at 543-44. 
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including summary executions and imprisonment, violence against 
children, sexual abuse, and torture.148 
The suits named as defendants approximately fifty U.S. and 
foreign corporations.149 The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the 
corporations, all of whom did business in South Africa during the 
apartheid years, aided and abetted the regime’s atrocities by supplying 
resources, such as oil, technology and capital, to the South African 
government, which used the resources in part “to further its policies of 
oppression and persecution of the African majority.”150 
The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim finding that, 
even assuming the South African government’s alleged conduct 
constituted a violation of the law of nations within the meaning of 
ATCA, aiding and abetting such conduct is not actionable under ATCA. 
The Court reached this conclusion by determining that aiding and 
abetting is not itself a violation of a sufficiently definite and universally 
accepted norm of international customary law and thus did not fit Sosa’s 
definition of the law of nations.151 In particular, the District Court refused 
to recognize as customary international law the rulings by the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
(ICTY and ICTR, respectively), and the Apartheid Convention, all of 
which recognized aiding-and-abetting liability for crimes against 
humanity.152 The District Court reasoned that, in contrast to the instant 
apartheid suits, the ICTY and ICTR dealt with criminal rather than civil 
matters.153 As for the Apartheid Convention, it was not a universally 
accepted source of international law because it was not ratified by 
several major world powers, including the United States.154  
The District Court further declined to find that ATCA itself 
recognized aiding-and-abetting liability, reasoning that under the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank, a civil statute should not be 
interpreted to authorize a cause of action against aiders and abettors 
unless Congress expressly provided for such liability.155 The District 
Court found the rule of Central Bank and the policies behind it 
particularly relevant to the present case because ATCA, like Section 
  
 148 Id. at 544. 
 149 Id. at 542-43. The list of defendants included such household names as Barclays, 
Bristol-Myers, Citigroup, Coca-Cola, DaimlerChrysler, Ford, General Electric, General Motors, 
IBM, Nestle, Shell Oil, Xerox, and others. Id. 
 150 Id. at 544-45. Specific examples of defendants’ products which the government used 
to commit its atrocities included cars outfitted with Daimler-Benz engines used in police raids, IBM 
computers used to monitor the black population, and electrical fences, watchtowers and armed 
personnel used to protect industrial facilities against civil unrest. Id. at 545. 
 151 Id. at 543, 549. 
 152 Id. at 550. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181-
82 (1994)). 
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10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, governs an area that is “ripe for 
non-meritorious and blunderbuss suits.” Additionally, it is the “Court’s 
duty to engage in ‘vigilant doorkeeping,’” by not allowing “innovative 
interpretations” of ATCA.156 Having found that there is no private cause 
of action for aiding and abetting under the ATCA, the District Court 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of jurisdiction.157 
2. The Second Circuit’s Split Decision 
Plaintiffs in In re South African Apartheid Litigation appealed 
the District Court’s dismissal of their complaints. On appeal, in 
Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.,158 the Second Circuit vacated 
the dismissal to the extent it related to the plaintiffs’ aiding-and-abetting 
claims.159 In a 2-to-1 decision, the majority—Judges Hall and 
Katzmann—held that the District Court erred in concluding that ATCA 
did not provide for federal jurisdiction over claims alleging aiding and 
abetting violations of customary international law.160 
Significantly, though, while agreeing that ATCA permitted 
aiding and abetting claims, the majority disagreed over the standard for 
stating such claims. Judge Hall concluded that the standard should be 
found in domestic federal common law.161 Contrarily, Judge Katzmann 
opined that the standard was governed by international customary law.162 
The third member of the panel, U.S. District Court Judge Korman, sitting 
by designation, dissented in the judgment, citing among many other 
grounds for dismissing the case his position that ATCA did not provide 
for aiding-and-abetting liability.163 However, he concurred in part with 
Judge Katzmann’s opinion, finding that the latter’s choice of 
international customary law represented “an emerging consensus” for 
determining the standard for aiding-and-abetting liability, which the 
plaintiffs in any case could not meet as a matter of law.164 These 
disagreements among the Judges highlight the current lack of a clear 
standard defining secondary actor liability under ATCA, and forecast the 
uncertain future of such claims.  
  
 156 Id. at 550-51 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004)). 
 157 Id. at 543. 
 158  Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam), 
aff’d, American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). 
 159 Id. at 264. 
 160 Id. at 260. 
 161 Id. at 287-88 (Hall, J., concurring). 
 162 Id. at 268 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 163 Id. at 320-21 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 164 Id. at 293, 333. 
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a. Judge Hall’s Opinion 
While recognizing that customary international law governed 
primary liability under ATCA,165 Judge Hall concluded that a federal 
court should derive a standard for secondary liability from domestic 
federal common law.166 Judge Hall reasoned that while international 
customary law could be relied on to provide a set of substantive 
principles, it was “unnecessary and implausible” to expect a consensus 
among different legal systems with regard to specific causes of action 
recognized by their respective courts.167 Therefore, it was up to the 
federal common law to fill the “interstice” created by the lack of 
conformity among international legal norms on various ancillary issues, 
such as secondary liability.168 
Having selected federal common law as the appropriate source 
for defining civil aiding-and-abetting liability, Judge Hall ruled that 
section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which defines third- 
party liability, was the proper standard for aiding-and-abetting liability in 
the context of ATCA.169 Under Judge Hall’s standard, then, a person aids 
and abets a violation of customary international law when that person 
provides another with substantial assistance with actual or constructive 
knowledge that the other will use the assistance to commit a violation of 
customary international law.170 In conclusion, Judge Hall suggested that 
the plaintiffs’ allegations, although not particularly specific, were 
sufficient to state a claim under this standard.171 
b. Judge Katzmann’s Opinion 
In contrast to Judge Hall, Judge Katzmann held in his opinion 
that courts must look at international law in determining whether a 
plaintiff can state a claim for aiding and abetting a violation of the law of 
nations.172 Judge Katzmann determined that the scope of liability under 
ATCA was intertwined with the scope of the courts’ jurisdictional power 
under the Act.173 According to Judge Katzmann, the limited scope of the 
jurisdictional power is best guarded against overextensions by “requiring 
that the specific conduct allegedly committed by the defendants sued 
  
 165 For example, genocide is defined in the 1951 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention), and crimes against humanity are 
described by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (the Nuremberg Tribunal). Id. at 285-
86 & n.2, 3 (Hall, J., concurring). 
 166 Id. at 284-86. 
 167 Id. at 286. 
 168 Id. at 287. 
 169 Id. at 288. 
 170 Id. at 288-89. 
 171 Id. at 291. 
 172 Id. at 268 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 173 Id. at 269. 
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represents a violation of international law.”174 In support of this 
argument, Judge Katzmann relied on dictum from Sosa, which referred 
to the hypothetical question of “whether international law extends the 
scope of liability” for a violation of the law of nations to private (as 
opposed to state) actors.175 Judge Katzmann reasoned that the question of 
whether liability for a violation of a particular norm reaches aiders and 
abettors is analogous to the Sosa Court’s hypothetical, and is therefore 
similarly governed by international law.176  
Judge Katzmann also carefully distinguished between the roles 
of federal common law and international law in recognizing specific 
causes of action under ATCA.177 While federal common law controls the 
question of what remedies are available for violations of international 
norms, the law of nations defines the scope of a particular violation and 
determines whether a federal court has the power to hear the suit in the 
first place.178 
Having determined that the question of aiding-and-abetting 
liability is governed by international common law, Judge Katzmann held 
that aiding and abetting is actionable under ATCA because States 
universally recognize, on a legal and moral level, “the individual 
responsibility of a defendant who aids and abets a violation of 
international law.”179 After reviewing the history of international criminal 
law norms, Judge Katzmannn discerned a core definition of aiding-and-
abetting liability that is sufficiently well-defined and widely accepted to 
command “the same level of consensus as the 18th-century crimes 
identified . . . in Sosa,” and thus should be recognized as the modern law 
of nations.180 Under this definition, a defendant aids and abets a violation 
of a norm of international common law, when the defendant “(1) 
provides practical assistance to the principal which has a substantial 
effect on the perpetration of the crime, and (2) does so with the purpose 
of facilitating the commission of that crime.”181 
  
 174 Id.  
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 269-70. 
 179 Id. at 270. 
 180 Id. at 276-77 & n.12. Judge Katzmann pointed out that individual responsibility of 
persons who aid and abet the perpetration of such crimes as genocide, slavery, torture and apartheid, 
has been recognized by numerous international treaties, and other international legal norms, in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Id. at 273-74. For example, aiding-and-abetting liability was 
expressly recognized by the statutes establishing the ICTY and the ICTR, which imposed liability on 
any person “who planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted the 
planning, preparation or execution” of a crime within the Tribunals’ jurisdictions. Id. at 274 (citing 
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6, S.C. 
Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 181 Id. at 277 & n.12. 
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Judge Katzmann argued that this formulation of aiding-and-
abetting liability finds reflection in a long tradition of international 
criminal norms.182 For example, the London Charter, which established 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to address Nazi war 
crimes and which has been recognized by federal courts and legal 
scholars as an authoritative source of international law,183 extended 
liability for certain war crimes to “accomplices participating in the 
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy.”184 More 
recently, liability for aiding and abetting violations of international law 
was codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(“Rome Statute”), which provides, inter alia, that a defendant is guilty of 
a crime if the defendant, “[f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission 
of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission.”185 
Judge Katzmann further rejected Judge Hall’s contention that 
reliance on international criminal law norms is not justified when 
formulating a standard for aiding and abetting in a civil case.186 Judge 
Katzmann explained that, first, “international law does not maintain the 
kind of hermetic seal between criminal and civil law that the district 
court sought to impose” and, second, prior case law “has consistently 
relied on criminal law norms in establishing the content of customary 
international law for purposes of ATCA.”187 
c. Judge Korman’s Opinion 
In contrast to the majority, Judge Korman rejected the 
proposition that the scope of ATCA necessarily extended to aiding-and-
abetting liability.188 He would therefore affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims against the secondary defendants.189 
Nevertheless, similar to Judge Katzmann, Judge Korman opined that, 
should ATCA be read to allow aiding-and-abetting liability, the standard 
for pleading such liability must be defined by norms of international 
common law.190 However, unlike Judge Katzmann, Judge Korman 
concluded that it is not enough to simply show that international 
  
 182 Id. at 271. 
 183 Id.  
 184 Id. at 272 (quoting Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, E.A.S. 472) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 185 Id. at 275 (quoting Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(3)(c), July 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90). The Rome Statute also makes a defendant liable for contributing to the 
commission of a crime “by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.” Id. (quoting Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra, at art. 25(3)(d), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90). This type of 
liability, unlike aiding and abetting, does not require intent to facilitate the commission of the crime; 
knowledge of the intent of the group is enough. Id. 
 186 Id. at 270 n.5. 
 187 Id.  
 188 Id. at 320-21 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 189 Id. at 337. 
 190 Id. at 331. 
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common law recognizes aiding-and-abetting liability in general. Instead, 
a plaintiff states a claim for aiding and abetting an international crime 
under ATCA only by invoking a norm of international law that 
establishes such liability for the particular underlying crime.191 In support 
of his proposition, Judge Korman relied on the language in Sosa, which 
“require[s] a norm-by-norm analysis to determine whether ‘international 
law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm’” by a 
secondary actor.192  
Thus, while Judge Korman agreed with Judge Katzmann that the 
Rome Statute’s definition of aiding and abetting certain crimes against 
humanity represented “an emerging consensus”193 regarding the standard 
for pleading aiding-and-abetting liability, no such definition existed at 
the time of the apartheid, and therefore plaintiffs could not state a claim 
against the defendants.194 In reaching his conclusion that the recognition 
of aiding-and-abetting liability in the context of genocide postdated the 
collapse of the apartheid government, Judge Korman provided his own 
interpretation of the development of post-World War II international law, 
different from those of the other two panel members. Thus, Judge 
Korman cited a judgment rendered by the Nuremberg Tribunal, which 
acquitted a banker accused of having authorized loans to German 
businesses, in spite of the banker’s knowledge that those businesses 
employed slave labor.195 Further, Judge Korman questioned Judge Hall’s 
conclusion that historical sources from the First Congress era indicated 
that “liability for aiding and abetting international law violations was 
contemplated under ATCA” by its drafters.196  
  
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)). 
 193 Id. at 293. In particular, Judge Korman noted that the Statute has been signed by the 
vast majority of democracies and is consistent with the U.S. domestic law. Id. at 333. Interestingly, 
the U.S. is one of few industrialized countries that have not signed the Rome Statute, but neither 
Judge Korman nor Judge Katzmann appeared to take issue with this. See id. at 276 n.9 (Katzmann, 
J., concurring) (contending that the United States’ refusal to sign the Statute is “unrelated to any 
concern over the definition of aiding-and-abetting”). 
 194 Id. at 333 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Failure of the law of 
nations at the time of the apartheid to recognize liability for aiding and abetting the kinds of human 
rights abuses alleged by plaintiffs was only one of the grounds on which Judge Korman would 
affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint. The other two grounds were public policy 
reasons which, according to Judge Korman, should compel the District Court to defer to the 
positions of the United State and South African governments and decline to exercise jurisdiction, id. 
at 295-311, and failure of international law, as it existed at the time of the apartheid, to recognize 
corporate liability for violations of human rights, id. at 311, 321-26. 
 195 Id. at 292 (citing United States v. von Weizsaecker, 14 Trials of War Criminals Before 
the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 308, 622 (William S. Hein & 
Co., 1997) (1949)) (holding that knowingly providing financing for an enterprise that used slave 
labor is not a violation of international law).  
 196 Id. at 328-29 (finding a 1795 opinion by Attorney General William Bradford, which 
suggested that British subjects could seek redress in a U.S. court under ATCA against Americans 
who “voluntarily joined, conducted, aided, and abetted a French fleet in attacking [a British] 
settlement,” ambiguous as to whether the defendants would be subject to primary or secondary 
liability) (quoting 1 Op. Att’y. Gen. 57 (1795)). 
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Finally, Judge Korman rejected the contention that aiding-and-
abetting liability under ATCA can be presumed from the general 
availability and understanding of this cause of action in the late 18th 
century.197 He opined that such a contention is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank, which held that courts must 
not automatically infer aiding-and-abetting liability from a statutorily 
created cause of action that did not expressly provide for such liability.198 
According to Judge Korman, the fact that “the same Congress that 
enacted ATCA, without reference to [aiding-and-abetting] liability, 
explicitly made it a crime to aid-and-abet acts of piracy”199 demonstrated 
Congress’s intent not to create aiding-and-abetting liability under 
ATCA.200 Therefore, Judge Korman concluded that the complaint should 
be dismissed because liability for the civil wrongs alleged by the 
plaintiffs was neither contemplated by the framers of ATCA, nor 
grounded in an international law norm that was in existence during the 
apartheid regime.201 
The Second Circuit’s split decision in Khulumani, therefore, 
demonstrates the complexity of the issues underlying the problem of 
holding secondary actors accountable for human rights abuses under 
ATCA. The decision failed to elucidate a single standard for pleading 
aiding-and-abetting liability under the Act.202 Moreover, Judge Korman’s 
dissent suggested a new trend towards a narrower construction of 
ATCA’s scope and away from allowing plaintiffs to recover from parties 
that did not themselves commit human rights abuses, but merely aided 
and abetted their commission. As discussed in the following Part, this 
trend echoes the evolution of secondary actor liability under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. 
V. COMPARING SECONDARY ACTOR LIABILITY UNDER ATCA AND 
SECTION 10(B) 
As demonstrated in Parts III and IV of this Note, suits filed 
under ATCA and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act often 
concern the common problem of extending liability beyond primary 
  
 197 Id. at 326. 
 198 Id. at 326-27 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 
164, 182 (1994)); see also supra Part III.B for a detailed discussion of Central Bank. 
 199 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 327. Judge Hall’s opinion cited this prohibition against aiding 
and abetting piracy—a quintessential violation of the law of nations—as evidence that Congress 
intended aiders and abettors to be liable under ATCA. Id. at 288 & n.5 (Hall, J., concurring). 
 200 Id. at 327 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he First 
Congress ‘knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so . . . .’”) (quoting 
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 174 (1994)). 
 201 Id. at 326. 
 202 See In re South African Apartheid Litig., Nos. 02 MDL 1499, 02 Civ. 4712, 02 Civ. 
6218, 03 Civ. 1024, 03 Civ. 4524, 2009 WL 960078, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2009) (stating that 
“the division of opinion between the [Judges] left [district courts] without a standard to apply or 
even a decision concerning the source of law from which . . . [to] derive a standard”). 
2009] SECONDARY ACTOR LIABILITY 1565 
wrongdoers to third parties whose conduct was instrumental in the 
perpetration of the wrong. In both cases, the resolution of the problem 
must turn on the interpretation of the scope of liability under the 
respective federal Act. Therefore, comparing the two Acts and analyzing 
the reasons for the Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretation of Section 
10(b)’s scope may shed light on the future of secondary actor liability 
under ATCA.  This part will show that, although, given the history of 
Section 10(b) jurisprudence, the Supreme Court is likely to adopt a 
similarly narrow approach to defining the scope of ATCA, this will not 
entirely preclude plaintiffs from holding culpable secondary actors 
accountable for violations of international law.  
A. In the Future, the Supreme Court Is Likely to Eliminate Aiding- 
and-Abetting Liability Under ATCA 
After the Second Circuit in Khulumani upheld the possibility of 
an aiding-and-abetting claim under ATCA and reversed the district 
court’s dismissal of the complaint, the defendants sought reversal by the 
Supreme Court. In May 2008, the Supreme Court denied the Khulumani 
defendants’ certiorari petition because the Court failed to reach a 
quorum.203 As a result, the issue of aiding-and-abetting liability under 
ATCA remains unresolved by the nation’s highest court.204 However, 
should the opportunity present itself again in the future, the Supreme 
  
 203 Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008); see also Tony Mauro, 
Supreme Court Recusals Hit Home in Controversial Apartheid Suit, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 2008, 
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202421335045. 
  204 The motions to dismiss by the various defendants have since been adjudicated by the 
district court on remand. On April 8, 2009, the district court granted in part and denied in part the 
motions. In re South African Apartheid Litig., Nos. 02 MDL 1499, 02 Civ. 4712, 02 Civ. 6218, 03 
Civ. 1024, 03 Civ. 4524, 2009 WL 960078, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2009). Adopting a common-
sense approach, district court Judge Shira Scheindlin looked at the “quality of the assistance 
provided to the primary violator.” Id. at *12. According to Judge Scheindlin, merely “doing 
business” with a perpetrator or funding its activities does not rise to the level of aiding and abetting. 
Id. However, providing goods “specifically designed” to enable the perpetrator to carry out its 
crimes may constitute aiding and abetting. Id. Applying these guidelines, Judge Scheindlin, first, 
dismissed aiding-and-abetting claims against Barclays and UBS, which allegedly provided loans to 
the South African government and bought army bonds, thus financing the apartheid regime. Id. at 
*20. Second, Judge Scheindlin upheld claims against defendants Daimler, Ford, and GM, alleging 
that the auto-makers sold specialized military vehicles to the South African army and police forces, 
which were then used for suppressing uprisings, id. at *16, and allowed its personnel to carry out the 
arrests and interrogations of dissidents on behalf of the South African government, id. at *15. The 
judge, however, dismissed, with leave to amend, those claims that merely alleged that the auto-
makers sold passenger cars and ordinary commercial trucks to the government, without evidence of 
“military customization or similar features that link [the vehicles] to an illegal use.” Id. at *18. 
Finally, the judge upheld claims against defendants IBM and Fujitsu alleging that the technology 
companies developed and sold to the South African government special software and hardware for 
processing and monitoring the country’s black population, id. at *16, *19, but dismissed those 
claims that merely asserted that the technology companies sold ordinary computers to government 
agencies, including the Department of Prisons, while knowing that the prisons practiced illegal 
detentions and torture, id. at *19. 
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Court is likely to rule that ATCA does not allow aiding-and-abetting 
liability.205 
1. The Central Bank Analytical Framework 
In considering whether to adopt an interpretation of ATCA that 
allows for aiding-and-abetting liability, the Supreme Court will be bound 
by the analytical framework of statutory interpretation it set forth in 
Central Bank. The application of Central Bank’s reasoning has not been 
limited to securities litigation and will be equally applicable in the 
context of an ATCA claim.206 The applicability of the Central Bank 
statutory interpretation analysis to ATCA is not changed by the fact that 
Central Bank interpreted the availability of an implied private right of 
action in a statute,207 whereas ATCA is jurisdictional in nature and does 
not create a cause of action, express or implied.208 The difference 
between a jurisdictional statute and one that creates a cause of action is 
that the latter gives a party substantive grounds for recovery in court, 
whereas the former merely allows a court to use its discretion in deciding 
whether to hear a case brought before it.209 This says nothing, however, 
about how courts should construe the statute in exercising their 
discretionary powers. Because federal courts derive their jurisdiction 
from Congress in the first place, “Congress, and not the courts . . . 
possesses the power to define the scope of the court’s jurisdiction.”210 
Therefore, there is no analytical difference between interpreting the 
scope of a congressionally-created cause of action and the scope of a 
  
 205 In doing so, the Supreme Court will go against lower courts’ precedent. But the 
Supreme Court did exactly that in Central Bank. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 192 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for 
eliminating aiding and abetting under Section 10(b), even though “[i]n hundreds of judicial and 
administrative proceedings in every Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have 
concluded that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b)”); Linda Greenhouse, High 
Court Ruling Sharply Curbs Suits on Securities Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1994, at D8 (reporting 
that the Supreme Court in Central Bank “swe[pt] aside years of lower court precedents as well as a 
longstanding policy of the Securities and Exchange Commission”). 
 206 See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 193 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (finding that “[t]he . . . reasons [set forth in Central Bank] militate equally against 
extending the implied cause of action [for gender discrimination] under Title IX to retaliation 
claims); see also Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(applying Central Bank’s reasoning to determine the scope of a counterterrorism statute because 
“nothing in [the Court’s] holding turns on particular features of [securities] laws”).  
 207 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 
171 (1994). 
 208 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004). 
 209 Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 676 (2005) 
(“Jurisdictional grants empower courts to hear and resolve cases brought before them by parties; 
substantive causes of action grant parties permission to bring those cases before the court.”). 
 210 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 266 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, 
J., concurring), aff’d, American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). 
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jurisdictional statute.211 Moreover, courts have previously rejected 
attempts to distinguish Central Bank on the basis of the particular cause 
of action it involved.212 Consequently, Central Bank will control the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the scope of ATCA. 
In deciding whether ATCA’s scope includes aiding-and-abetting 
liability, the Court will follow a three-step approach employed in Central 
Bank for analyzing the scope of liability under Section 10(b). In Central 
Bank, the Court first examined the language of the statute to decide 
whether Section 10(b) could be said to prohibit aiding and abetting.213 
Second, the Court considered whether such prohibition could be implied 
from the congressional intent at the time of Section 10(b)’s enactment.214 
Finally, the Court weighed policy reasons for and against expanding 
Section 10(b)’s liability to reach aiders and abettors.215  
2. Statutory Language 
Consistent with the Central Bank framework, in deciding 
whether ATCA reaches aiders and abettors, the Supreme Court will be 
compelled to first look at ATCA’s language. Statutory language is 
controlling with respect to determining the scope of liability under an act 
of Congress.216 In Central Bank, the Supreme Court found the absence of 
any reference to aiding and abetting in the text of Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act to be dispositive of the issue of whether the 
Section reached aiders and abettors.217 
In the years since Central Bank, courts have followed the same 
rationale in refusing to expand the scope of liability under other federal 
statutes. For example, in Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc.,218 the Ninth Circuit 
held that liability under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA) did not extend to aiders and abettors.219 ECPA prohibits any 
“person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the 
public [from] knowingly divulg[ing] to any person or entity the contents 
  
 211 See id. at 266 n.2 (suggesting that “because federal courts have only the jurisdiction 
granted to them by Congress, their exercise of common-law discretion is better viewed as creating a 
cause of action than jurisdiction”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 212 See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(noting that Central Bank’s reasoning is not limited to statutes that create an implied private right of 
action, because the holding in the case applied to suits by non-private parties as well). 
 213 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 
173 (1994). 
 214 Id. at 178, 180-81. 
 215 Id. at 188. 
 216 Id. at 173. Statutory language is “[t]he starting point in every case involving 
construction of a statute.” Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197) (alteration in 
original). 
 217 Id. at 175 (noting that “the language of Section 10(b) does not in terms mention aiding 
and abetting” (quoting Brief for Security and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 8, 511 
U.S. 164 (1994) (No. 92-854)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 218 457 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 219 Id. at 1002. 
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of a communication while in electronic storage by that service.”220 The 
statute further authorizes a private cause of action against anyone who 
intentionally or knowingly “engage[s]” in the prohibited conduct.221  
The plaintiffs in Freeman were internet users who participated in 
online message boards dedicated to pirating satellite television signals.222 
The content of the message boards became subject to a separate, 
unrelated dispute involving DirecTV, a provider of satellite television.223 
The Freeman plaintiffs alleged that DirecTV violated ECPA by aiding 
and abetting the internet provider in the unauthorized disclosure of the 
message board communications to third parties.224 In rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ theory of liability, the court stated that it was bound by a 
statute’s plain language unless it would lead to an unreasonable result.225 
The court reasoned that since the text of ECPA made no reference to 
aiding-and-abetting liability, such liability was beyond the statute’s 
scope.226 The plaintiffs argued that aiding-and-abetting liability was 
available within a reasonable construction of ECPA’s plain language, 
because the statute expressly authorized suits against those who 
“engage[]” in the prohibited conduct.227 The court disagreed, finding that, 
viewed in the textual context of the statute as a whole, the word 
“engage[]” could not be read so broadly as to include aiding and 
abetting.228 
Similarly, in Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development,229 the Seventh Circuit held that a federal statute that 
provides a private cause of action to any U.S. national who was 
“injured . . . by reason of an act of international terrorism”230 did not 
authorize suits against aiders and abettors of terrorism.231 In Boim, 
parents of an American teenager killed in Israel by Hamas militants sued 
several U.S. Muslim non-profit organizations alleging that the non-profit 
organizations assisted international terrorism by providing financial 
  
 220 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006). 
 221 Id. § 2707(a). 
 222 Freeman, 457 F.3d at 1003. 
 223 Id. at 1002-03. 
 224 Id. at 1003. Plaintiffs could not sue DirecTV as a primary violator of the ECPA 
because the TV company was not a provider of the internet service that stored the message board 
communications. Id. at 1004. Thus, the court was limited to deciding whether DirecTV could be held 
liable as a secondary actor. Id. 
 225 Id. at 1004-05 (“The starting point of [a statute’s] interpretation . . . is always its 
language.”). 
 226 Id. at 1005. 
 227 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (2006). 
 228 Freeman, 457. F.3d at 1005. 
 229 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 230 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). Section 2333(a) was originally enacted as part of the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1990, and reenacted two years later as part of the Federal Courts Administration 
Act of 1992, under the title “Terrorism Civil Remedy.” See Seth N. Stratton, Note, Taking Terrorists 
to Court: A Practical Evaluation of Civil Suits Against Terrorists Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 9 
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 27, 30 n.19 (2004). 
 231 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 688-90 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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support to Hamas.232 In rejecting that part of the plaintiff’s rationale, the 
court reasoned that, under Central Bank, the statute’s failure to mention 
aiding and abetting or other types of secondary liability meant such 
liability does not exist.233 Since ATCA, like ECPA and the 
counterterrorism provision in Boim, does not mention aiding and 
abetting, the Supreme Court will have to conclude that the Act’s express 
language does not authorize aiding-and-abetting liability.234 
3. Congressional Intent to Create an Implied Right of Action 
Having reached that conclusion, however, the Supreme Court 
will proceed to the second step of the Central Bank analysis to determine 
whether, given Congress’s intent, a private right of action against aiders 
and abettors should be implied under ATCA.235 On the one hand, a 
legislature’s failure to provide expressly for aiding-and-abetting liability 
under a statute is evidence that the legislature did not intend to 
incorporate such liability into the statute.236 This is especially true when 
the legislature expressly authorizes aiding-and-abetting liability in other 
contexts.237 On the other hand, evidence that Congress was generally 
  
 232 Id. at 688. Hamas, also known as Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Palestinian 
religious and political group that is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. 
Government. See Garry W. Jenkins, Soft Power, Strategic Security, and International Philanthropy, 
85 N.C. L. REV. 773, 817 n.186 (2007); Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder: Hamas, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968 (last visited on Apr. 15, 2009); U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of 
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Fact Sheet: Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Apr. 8, 2008), 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/08/103392.htm. 
 233 Boim, 549 F.3d at 689 (“[S]tatutory silence on the subject of secondary liability means 
there is none . . . .”). Boim was an en banc rehearing of a prior panel decision, Boim v. Quranic 
Literacy Institute, which had concluded that liability under Section 2333(a) did extend to aiders and 
abettors. Id. at 688; see Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1021 (7th Cir. 
2002). The panel in the original Boim I suit acknowledged the significance of the Central Bank 
rationale in interpreting the scope of liability under a federal statute. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1017-19. 
However, the panel distinguished Central Bank, finding that extending liability under Section 
2333(a) to aiders and abettors was justified given the legislative intent and the policies behind the 
counterterrorism laws. Id. at 1019. 
 234 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 326 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing as erroneous and contrary to 
precedent, an “assumption that, even though ATCA does not by its terms encompass aiding-and-
abetting liability, it should be construed as if it contains such language”), aff’d, American Isuzu 
Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). 
 235 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 
178 (1994); see also Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1103 (1991) (“[T]he central 
inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private 
cause of action.”) (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979)). 
 236 Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 177 (“If . . . Congress intended to impose aiding 
and abetting liability, we presume it would have used the words ‘aid’ and ‘abet’ in the statutory text. 
But it did not.”); see also Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“There is 
no explicit provision in §§ 2702 and 2707 or anywhere else in the ECPA, providing for secondary 
liability. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress knew what it was doing by not 
including such claims.”). 
 237 Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 184 (Congress’s special provision for liability of 
“controlling person[s]” under Section 20 of the Securities Exchange Act shows that “[w]hen 
Congress wished to create such [secondary] liability, it had little trouble doing so.”) (citing Pinter v. 
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aware of aiding-and-abetting liability and that the doctrine was well-
established at the time of the statute’s enactment, does not, in and of 
itself, warrant a presumption that Congress intended to implicitly 
incorporate aiding-and-abetting liability into every federal law.238 
Further, courts both before and after Central Bank, have warned 
against interpreting legislative intent in a way that creates new causes of 
action.239 In Central Bank, the Court expressed a concern over reading 
aiding-and-abetting liability into Section 10(b)’s prohibition against 
fraudulent statements.240 The Court’s reason for the concern was that 
doing so would expose to liability those who do not, whether directly or 
indirectly, engage in conduct prohibited by the statute.241 This, according 
to the Court, would allow a plaintiff to successfully sue a defendant 
under Section 10(b) without satisfying all elements of liability critical to 
recovery, e.g. reliance.242 The Court refused to impute to the legislature 
an intention to create such an “anomalous” result.243 
Four of the Supreme Court’s nine Justices subscribed to the same 
rationale in interpreting the scope of liability under another federal 
statute in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education.244 In Jackson, a 
school coach of a girls’ basketball team sued his school under Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibit in-school 
discrimination on the basis sex.245 The coach alleged that he was a victim 
of sex discrimination because, after he had complained to his supervisors 
about disparate treatment of the girls’ team, the school retaliated against 
him by removing him from his coach position.246 While the majority in 
Jackson upheld the plaintiff’s claim, the dissenting Justices argued 
against expanding liability under Title IX to encompass retaliation. The 
dissent analogized the case with Central Bank and reasoned that similar 
to aiding and abetting claims under Section 10(b), claims based merely 
on retaliation would lack elements required for prevailing on a claim of 
discrimination, because retaliation can take place without 
  
Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 650 (1988)) (alterations in original). “Congress knew how to impose aiding and 
abetting liability when it chose to do so.” Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 176. 
 238 Id. at 180-81. The Supreme Court also questioned the extent to which civil aiding-and-
abetting liability was an established doctrine in the 1930s, or even is today, noting that “Congress 
has not enacted a general civil aiding and abetting statute” and that the doctrine’s application in 
common law is infrequent and uncertain. Id. at 181-82. 
 239 See, e.g., Va. Bankshares, Inc., 501 U.S. at 1102 (“[T]he breadth of the right once 
recognized should not, as a general matter, grow beyond the scope congressionally intended.”); 
Freeman, 457 F.3d at 1006 (“When a statute is precise about who . . . can be liable courts should not 
implicitly read secondary liability into the statute.”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 240 Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 176. 
 241 Id. (“[A]iding and abetting liability reaches persons who do not engage in the 
proscribed activities at all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do.”). 
 242 Id. at 180. 
 243 Id.  
 244 544 U.S. 167 (2005). 
 245 Id. at 171. 
 246 Id. at 171-72. 
2009] SECONDARY ACTOR LIABILITY 1571 
discrimination.247 Such interpretation of the statute, in the dissent’s 
opinion, would ignore Congress’s intent because it would effectively 
read a completely new cause of action into the statute.248 
For the same reason, the Supreme Court will likely decline to 
read aiding and abetting into ATCA by implication. ATCA makes no 
mention of aiding-and-abetting liability or similar types of secondary 
liability. Yet just a year after enacting ATCA, Congress passed a law 
prohibiting piracy and other similar acts of hostility against the United 
States, and expressly made liable those who “knowingly and wittingly 
aid and assist, procure, command, counsel or advise” the commission of 
such acts.249 Thus, the Supreme Court, consistent with its reasoning in 
Central Bank, will likely conclude that the 1st Congress “knew how to 
impose aiding-and-abetting liability when it chose to do so,”250 and that 
Congress’s failure to provide for aiding-and-abetting liability in ATCA 
shows lack of intent to do so.251 Moreover, the Supreme Court is unlikely 
to agree with Judge Hall’s characterization in Khulumani that “the 
Founding Generation . . . understood that ATCA encompassed aiding 
and abetting.”252 Regardless of the particular merits of Judge Hall’s 
characterization, the doctrine of aiding-and-abetting liability was 
undoubtedly less developed in the 1780s than in the 1930s.253 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court will probably refuse to impute to the 1st 
Congress a broadly defined intent to attach aiding-and-abetting liability 
to all of its legislative acts, just like it refused to impute such intent to the 
73d Congress in Central Bank. 
Further, the Supreme Court will likely be reluctant to read 
Congress’s intent in a way that would expand the scope of ATCA’s 
  
 247 Id. at 194 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 248 Id. (“[B]y recognizing [the plaintiff’s] claim, the majority creates an entirely new 
cause of action . . . .”); cf. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 689-90 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (arguing, along the same lines, that implying secondary liability in section 2333(a) of the 
Terrorism Civil Remedy statute would impermissibly expand the statute’s scope by “enlarg[ing] the 
federal courts’ extraterritorial jurisdiction”). 
 249 Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 9, 10, 1 Stat. 112, 114 (1790). 
 250 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 
176 (1994). 
 251 See also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 326-27 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he same Congress that enacted the 
ATCA, without reference to aiding-and-abetting liability, explicitly made it a crime to aid-and-abet 
acts of piracy, a violation of the law of nations.”), aff’d, American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 
128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). 
 252 Id. at 288 n.5 (Hall, J., concurring). In support of this proposition, Judge Hall cited, 
inter alia, a 1795 opinion by Attorney General Bradford, which appears to state that liability under 
ATCA could attach to U.S. citizens who “voluntarily joined, conducted, aided, and abetted a French 
fleet in attacking” a British settlement in West Africa. Id.; 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 57-59 (1795). Judge 
Korman, however, rebutted Judge Hall’s reading of the opinion, finding it ambiguous as to whether 
the Attorney General referred to primary or secondary liability. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 329 
(Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 253 The doctrine of aiding-and-abetting liability originates in criminal law. Eid, supra note 
28, at 1180; see also Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 181. But Congress did not codify criminal 
aiding and abetting until 1902, long after the passage of ATCA. See 60 Cong. Ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088 
(1909). 
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liability to reach aiders and abettors because doing so could create “an 
entirely new cause of action”254 lacking elements required under ATCA. 
Currently, ATCA, as explained in Sosa, only permits claims for a 
violation of an international norm that is “accepted by the civilized world 
and defined with a specificity comparable to” the acceptance and 
specificity enjoyed by “the historical paradigms” of the late 17th 
century.255 Given the uncertainty surrounding the doctrine of aiding-and-
abetting liability, and the standard by which it should be defined,256 
expanding the scope of ATCA could expose to liability those who, while 
aiding and abetting an international crime, do not themselves violate a 
universally accepted and sufficiently well-defined norm of international 
law. The Supreme Court is unlikely to accept a statutory interpretation 
that could lead to such a result. 
4. Public Policy Considerations 
Finally, having reached the last step of its analytical framework, 
the Supreme Court is equally likely to reject aiding-and-abetting liability 
under ATCA on public policy grounds. Although not an independent 
basis for statutory interpretation, public policy considerations may be 
used to buttress the Court’s decision not to expand the scope of ATCA.257 
Policy review is especially appropriate where, as in ATCA’s case, there 
is scant direct evidence of congressional intent.258  
Similar sets of conflicting policy considerations permeate the 
subject of secondary actor liability in the securities fraud and ATCA 
litigation contexts. Before Central Bank, the main arguments in favor of 
attaching secondary liability to aiders and abettors were deterrence and 
fairness.259 After Central Bank, plaintiffs have similarly argued that 
holding culpable secondary actors liable under Section 10(b) is necessary 
  
 254 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 195 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 255 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725, 732 (2004); see also supra note 116 and 
accompanying text. 
 256 Cf. Judge Katzmann’s and Judge Hall’s divergent definitions for aiding and abetting in 
Khulumani, supra Part IV.B.2. 
 257 Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188 (“Policy considerations cannot override our 
interpretation of the text and structure of the Act, except to the extent they may help to show that 
adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result ‘so bizarre’ that Congress could not have 
intended it.”). 
 258 See Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1104-05 (1991) (stating that 
where a right of action was originally inferred from a statute in the absence of “conclusive guidance” 
from the legislature, courts may “look[] to policy reasons for deciding where the outer limits of the 
right should lie”). 
 259 See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188 (paraphrasing an amicus party’s argument 
that “the aiding and abetting cause of action deters secondary actors from contributing to fraudulent 
activities and ensures that defrauded plaintiffs are made whole”). 
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as a deterrent against fraud on the securities markets,260 and is consistent 
with the notion that no act of deliberate fraud should go unpunished.261  
At the same time, many arguments have been advanced against 
exposing secondary actors to liability under Section 10(b). Thus, in 
Central Bank, the Supreme Court noted the uncertainty surrounding the 
standard for determining aiding-and-abetting liability as a factor against 
extending Section 10(b)’s reach.262 First, the court reasoned that this 
uncertainty in the rules would tend to protract litigation and increase the 
cost of defense. As a result, many secondary actors, including those with 
valid defenses, would be forced to settle rather than litigate. This, in turn, 
would result in the proliferation of strike suits, and other meritless 
litigation. Finally, in the Court’s opinion, excessive and extortionate 
litigation would send ripples throughout the securities markets, raising 
the cost of doing business in the United States.263 These costs would 
ultimately be passed on to investors, whom the Securities Exchange Act 
is supposed to protect.264 
In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court also used public policy 
analysis to further narrow the scope of Section 10(b) liability to exclude 
“scheme liability.”265 In particular, the Court emphasized the existence of 
alternative remedies that can both serve as a deterrent to fraud and 
provide recovery to injured investors. Thus, the court pointed out that 
secondary actors who engage in fraud remain subject to criminal laws,266 
state anti-fraud statutes,267 and civil actions brought by the SEC.268 
Critics of ATCA have set forth remarkably similar arguments in 
favor of restricting its scope to exclude aiding-and-abetting liability. In 
In re South African Apartheid Litigation, Judge Sprizzo characterized 
ATCA litigation as “an area that is . . . ripe for non-meritorious and 
blunderbuss suits.”269 Critics also often underscore the vexatious nature 
  
 260 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 778 n.10 
(2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he availability of private rights of action . . . provide[s] a means 
for defrauded investors to recover damages and a powerful deterrent against violations of the 
securities laws.”). 
 261 Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 782 (“Congress enacted § 10(b) with the understanding that 
. . . every wrong would have a remedy.”); Apolinsky, supra note 97, at 2 (suggesting as one rationale 
for holding secondary actors accountable under Section 10(b) “to punish as many wrongdoers as 
possible who participated in the scheme”).  
 262 Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188. 
 263 Id. at 189. 
 264 Id.  
 265 Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770, 772-73.  
 266 Id. at 773 (“[C]riminal penalties are a strong deterrent.”). 
 267 Id. (noting that “some state securities laws permit state authorities to seek fines and 
restitution from aiders and abettors”). 
 268 Id. (stating that since 2002, the SEC recovered approximately $10 billion for the 
benefit of investors harmed by fraud). The SEC is authorized to sue aiders and abettors of securities 
fraud under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006). 
 269 In re South African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d 
in part and denied in part, Khulmani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d, 
American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). 
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of ATCA litigation by pointing to the extraordinarily large amounts 
demanded by the plaintiffs.270 
In Khulumani, Judge Korman cited other public policy grounds 
for restricting the scope of liability under ATCA to primary violations.  
He noted that allowing suits against companies that do business with 
oppressive regimes would have a “chilling effect” on foreign direct 
investment in those countries.271 Additionally, Judge Korman pointed to 
the efforts of the modern South African government to provide 
restitution and other forms of relief to victims of the apartheid as more 
appropriate domestic alternatives to suits in the U.S.272 Critics have also 
advanced other alternatives to suits under ATCA, such as government 
sanctions273 and the creation of an internationally enforceable code of 
corporate conduct.274 Given the similarity between these concerns and 
those expressed over securities fraud suits, the Supreme Court is likely to 
weigh public policy considerations against expanding the scope of 
ATCA. 
Thus, when the Supreme Court has the opportunity again to 
review the scope of ATCA, it will likely rule that the Act does not permit 
aiding-and-abetting liability, just like the Court eliminated aiding-and-
abetting liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act in 
Central Bank. Applying Central Bank’s analytical framework, the Court 
will likely find that ATCA’s silence on the matter, Congress’s failure to 
provide for aiding-and-abetting liability under the Act in spite of its 
familiarity with the doctrine, and strong policy considerations, all weigh 
against expanding the scope of ATCA to reach aiders and abettors. 
B. Elimination of Aiding-and-Abetting Liability Under ATCA Will 
Not Mean the End of Corporate Accountability for Human 
Rights Abuses 
The issue of aiding-and-abetting liability under ATCA is of great 
concern for plaintiffs’ lawyers and human rights advocates, and the 
Supreme Court’s potential rejection of this theory of liability is likely to 
  
 270 For example, the plaintiffs in In re South African Apartheid Litigation demanded over 
$40 billion in damages. In re South African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 546. 
 271 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 297 (2d Cir. 2007) (Korman, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d, American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 
2424 (2008). But see Herz, supra note 131, at 209-10 (arguing that the availability of aiding-and-
abetting liability actually encourages investment by promoting corporate responsibility and 
“constructive engagement”). 
 272 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 297, 301. 
 273 See Ivan Poullaos, The Nature of the Beast: Using the Alien Torts Claims Act to 
Combat International Human Rights Violations, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 354 (2002) (addressing the 
shortcomings of this alternative). 
 274 Pia Zara Thadhani, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Abuses: Is Unocal the 
Answer?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 622 (2000). 
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be viewed as a setback for victims of human rights abuses.275 An 
interpretation of ATCA that eliminates aiding-and-abetting liability will 
close off the “path of least resistance” for asserting claims of human 
rights violations against corporations.276 However, upon a closer look, it 
becomes clear that the concerns may be exaggerated. In light of the 
resilience of claims against secondary actors in the securities fraud 
context after Central Bank and Stoneridge, and the availability of several 
alternative remedies, the loss of aiding-and-abetting liability in the 
ATCA plaintiffs’ litigation playbook is similarly unlikely to have a 
substantial negative impact on the ability of victims of human rights 
abuses to recover from corporate wrongdoers. 
First, the proliferation of the Section 10(b) litigation in the years 
following Central Bank,277 including many successful claims against 
secondary actors,278 suggests that ATCA plaintiffs will also continue to 
bring successful claims against secondary actors under the primary 
liability theory. When the Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Central Bank, it was initially viewed as a victory for the business 
community.279 However, it soon became clear that Central Bank did not 
present a serious bar to meritorious claims against culpable secondary 
actors. Grasping onto the Court’s assurance that a secondary actor “may 
be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the 
requirements for primary liability . . . are met,” plaintiffs’ lawyers were 
able to shift the focus from asserting aiding and abetting to pleading 
primary violations by secondary actors.280  
  
 275 See Anthony J. Sebok, More on the Second Circuit’s Recent, Significant Decision 
Regarding Two Suits Involving the Alien Tort Claims Act: Part Two in a Two-Part Series, FINDLAW, 
Nov. 6, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20071106.html (“[A]iding and abetting under the 
ATCA has become a very important topic, since it is the primary theory of liability that allows 
human rights lawyers to sue corporations.”). 
 276 Cf. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 497-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating 
that, prior to Central Bank, aiding-and-abetting liability provided a “path of least resistance” for 
plaintiffs seeking to hold liable multiple corporate actors engaged in a common deceptive scheme). 
 277 For example, plaintiffs filed 111 suits in 1996, 173 in 1997, and 242 in 1998, 
eventually leveling at approximately 192 suits per year. Cornerstone Research, Litigation Activity 
Indices, http://securities.cornerstone.com/Research/litigation.htm (last visited January 29, 2009). 
 278 See supra Part III.C. 
 279 Thom Weidlich, Professionals Still at Risk: Plaintiffs’ Bar Shifts Gears to Revise 
Claims in Central Bank’s Wake, NAT’L L.J., July 18, 1994, at A4. 
 280 Id. (reporting that most complaints had either already alleged primary liability against 
secondary actors in addition to aiding and abetting, or can be easily amended to do so after Central 
Bank because “[t]he conduct is no different from the conduct [the plaintiffs] were attacking before”). 
Amending often did not present much of a challenge, since many of the stronger claims against 
secondary actors were based on facts that were sufficient to plead the elements of primary liability. 
Id. (“That the plaintiffs now must prove direct fraud does not necessarily mean they need to prove 
different facts; the two theories are often alleged on the same facts.”); see id. (“Your case is going to 
fly or not depending on what kind of direct involvement the [secondary actor] had in getting 
securities sold. It’s always going to come down to what did the [secondary actor] know, when did 
[she] know it and what did [she] do with the knowledge.”) (quoting a plaintiff’s lawyer) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) ; see also supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text (discussing the use of 
“scheme liability” to test the limits of primary liability). 
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Even the Supreme Court’s more restrictive decision in 
Stoneridge did not entirely foreclose secondary actor liability from the 
securities fraud context.281 For example, the decision left the door open to 
claims against secondary actors whose conduct is not “too remote to 
satisfy the reliance requirement.”282 In addition, claims against secondary 
actors whose conduct was not “in the ordinary course” of a business 
relationship with the primary defendant, but rather directly affected the 
market for securities, will also likely be sustained under Stoneridge.283  
Similarly, in the event the Supreme Court refuses to recognize 
aiding-and-abetting liability under ATCA, plaintiffs will still be able to 
bring meritorious claims against secondary actors by alleging primary 
violations of international law. Just as in the securities fraud context the 
focus of the claims shifted to proving scienter and reliance, the focus of 
ATCA claims against corporations complicit in human rights abuses will 
shift to proving intent and causation.284 Claims that involve a corporation 
merely “doing business in countries with repressive regimes”285 may have 
to fall by the wayside, just like Section 10(b) claims grounded in the 
“ordinary course” of the defendant’s business. But stronger claims with a 
closer link between the company’s actions and the human rights abuse, 
will probably survive. 
Judge Scheindlin’s recent on-remand decision in In Re South 
African Apartheid Litigation286 illustrates the often illusory line between 
primary and secondary liability. Although ruling from the tentatively-
upheld position that ATCA allows aiding-and-abetting liability, Judge 
Scheindlin nevertheless focused her analysis of the individual claims on 
the closeness of the “causal connection” between the secondary 
defendant’s conduct and the underlying crime, on the one hand,287 and on 
the secondary defendant’s state of mind, on the other hand288—both 
factors that determine a defendant’s primary liability for the wrong. 
  
 281 Robert Schwinger & Eric Twiste, Stoneridge: Not the End of the Road, Securities Law 
360, Jan. 18, 2008 (“[I]t still remains to be seen whether the ever-creative securities fraud bar will be 
able to find ways to recharacterize their cases against secondary actors so as to be able to keep them 
viable even under the strictures laid down in Stoneridge.”). 
 282 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 770 (2008). 
 283 Id. at 774 (stating that the plaintiffs did not meet the Section 10(b) reliance 
requirement because the secondary actors “were acting in concert with Charter in the ordinary course 
as suppliers” and their round-tripping arrangements “took place in the marketplace for goods and 
services, not in the investment sphere”). 
 284 To paraphrase the lawyer interviewed in the National Law Journal article, each “case 
is going to fly or not depending on what kind of direct involvement the [complicit corporation] had 
in [committing the particular human rights violation]. It’s always going to come down to what did 
the [corporation] know, when did [the corporation] know it and what did [the corporation] do with 
the knowledge.” Weidlich, supra note 279 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 285 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 289 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J., 
concurring), aff’d, American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). 
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WL 960078 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2009). 
 287 Id. at *12. 
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Thus, Judge Scheindlin upheld aiding-and-abetting genocide claims 
against car manufacturers that supplied the South African military with 
custom-made armed vehicles and authorized its own security personnel 
to carry out arrests and interrogations on behalf of the police289—conduct 
that would probably also rise to the level of a primary offense. At the 
same time, Judge Scheindlin dismissed several claims predicated on the 
corporate defendants’ less culpable acts, such as providing loans to the 
South African government290 or selling computers to government 
agencies,291 thus dispelling the misguided fear that ATCA potentially 
exposes to liability anyone who “does business” with a rogue State.  
The second reason why human rights advocates should not fear 
the Supreme Court’s likely abandonment of aiding-and-abetting liability 
under ATCA is the availability of several viable alternative theories for 
recovery from corporate defendants. In the Section 10(b) context, actions 
by the SEC, which are not subject to the Central Bank and Stoneridge 
restrictions, have recovered billions of dollars for the benefit of 
defrauded investors.292 In the ATCA context, as an alternative to aiding 
and abetting, victims can recover from corporations on the theories of 
conspiracy, joint criminal enterprise, instigation, and procurement.293  
Finally, abandoning aiding-and-abetting liability will eliminate 
redundancies in the structure of ATCA claims. As in the securities fraud 
context, the same conduct can often be characterized either as aiding and 
abetting or as a direct violation. For example, in Boim v. Holy Land 
Foundation for Relief & Development, Judge Posner declined to 
recognize aiding-and-abetting liability under the federal Terrorism Civil 
Remedy statute, but instead imposed liability on the defendants through a 
“chain of incorporations by reference” of several statutory definitions.294 
He found that although the statute did not prohibit aiding and abetting an 
act of international terrorism, providing financial assistance to a foreign 
terrorist organization may sometimes itself constitute “international 
terrorism” under the statute’s definition of the term.295  
Similarly, Judge Korman’s opinion in Khulumani proposes a 
standard for aiding and abetting that makes the doctrine obsolete in the 
context of ATCA claims. According to Judge Korman, to plead aiding 
  
 289  Id. at *15-*16; see also note 204. 
 290  In re South African Apartheid Litig., 2009 WL 960078, at *20; see also note 204. 
 291  In re South African Apartheid Litig., 2009 WL 960078, at *19; see also note 204. 
 292 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 773 (2008); 
see supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
 293 See Herz, supra note 131, at 216-17 (“Aiding and abetting is not the only form of 
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violations of universally recognized human rights.”); Maassarani, supra note 17, at 39 (noting that 
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 294 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 2008); see 
supra notes 229-234 and accompanying text. 
 295 Boim, 549 F.3d at 690. 
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and abetting, a plaintiff has to show that the defendant violated a 
universal international norm that extends aiding-and-abetting liability to 
the particular underlying international law offense giving rise to the 
suit.296 Under this standard then, one who aids and abets a violation of an 
international legal norm will also necessarily violate a universal 
international law himself, and thus become liable as a primary actor 
under ATCA. Eliminating such redundancies in the structure of the 
claims may actually benefit the cause of human rights advocacy by 
removing confusion from the courts, streamlining litigation, and shifting 
the focus to the issues of culpability and causation. 
Thus, although a decision by the Supreme Court that limits the 
scope of ATCA to exclude aiding-and-abetting liability will eliminate 
one possible theory of recovery, it will not deprive deserving plaintiffs of 
relief. Instead, it will bring the courts’ adjudication of ATCA claims in 
line with the related and more mature securities fraud jurisprudence. By 
doing so, it will screen out the weakest claims against corporate actors 
whose participation in human rights abuses is only attenuated, without at 
the same time denying plaintiffs the opportunity to assert stronger claims 
against secondary actors for primary violations, or to pursue alternative 
routes of redress. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Holding secondary actors (in particular, corporations) 
accountable for their indirect participation in serious misconduct, 
remains a continuing concern for victims of securities fraud and human 
rights abuses alike. In a globalized world market, corporate players have 
the capacity to inflict serious harm on vast numbers of people without 
necessarily assuming the role of the primary perpetrator. Yet the doctrine 
of secondary liability is underdeveloped, poorly defined, and excessively 
politicized.297 In the context of securities litigation, since 1994, the 
Supreme Court has taken a course towards restricting the doctrine’s 
application in Section 10(b) suits, first eliminating the lynchpin of 
secondary actor liability—aiding-and-abetting—in Central Bank, and 
then further narrowing the scope of this type of liability in Stoneridge.298 
The doctrine, however, has been remarkably resilient to the Court’s 
narrowing, and secondary actors continue to be held liable under Section 
10(b).299 Consistent with its own precedent, the Supreme Court will likely 
similarly restrict secondary liability under ATCA in the near future, as 
foreshadowed by the Second Circuit’s divided opinion in Khulumani. 
Yet the resilience of secondary actor suits under Section 10(b) suggests 
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that secondary actor liability will likewise survive in the context of 
ATCA claims. Although it may have to shed the somewhat antiquated 
theory of aiding and abetting along the way, secondary actor liability 
under ATCA will continue to provide relief for victims of human rights 
abuse around the world. 
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